The Role of Regulation in Political Lobbying and the Promotion of Transparency and Accountability: A Comparative Mexican Perspective

This research examines the role of government regulations in shaping transparency and accountability in political lobbying in Mexico, using a comparative perspective. The study is rooted in the neo-institutionalist framework, specifically the rational choice theory proposed by Elinor Ostrom, which posits that political actors operate within a system of rules and incentives that shape their behavior. By analyzing the effectiveness of these regulations, the research seeks to understand how they influence the transparency of lobbying activities and the motivations of legislators. The central hypothesis suggests that transparency in lobbying is not solely dependent on the existence and enforcement of regulations but is also significantly influenced by the underlying motivations of legislators. Effective regulation, combined with motivations aligned with transparency, is expected to result in clearer and more open lobbying practices. Conversely, weak enforcement and conflicting motivations may lead to continued opacity in political lobbying. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, including quantitative analysis through surveys conducted with members of lobbying organizations and qualitative analysis based on semi-structured interviews with legislators and lobbyists. This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of how regulatory frameworks and personal motivations interact to impact the transparency of lobbying activities. The findings aim to contribute to the broader discourse on legislative transparency in Latin America by providing empirical evidence on the conditions under which transparency in lobbying can be improved. The Mexican case, with its unique regulatory environment, offers valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities for enhancing accountability in the political process through effective regulation.